

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SANA 01284 190835Z

17

ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 PM-04 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00

INR-07 NSAE-00 MC-02 ACDA-07 OMB-01 H-02 TRSE-00

AID-05 IGA-02 L-03 /078 W
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P R 171300Z APR 76

FM AMEMBASSY SANA

TO AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7842

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

SECDEF WASH DC

CHUSMTM DHAHRAN

S E C R E T SANA 1284

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, SA, YE, MASS, MARR

SUBJECT: ARMS ASSISTANCE TO THE YAR

REF: JIDDA 2620; STATE 090245

1. SUMMARY. WISH TO FLAG SEVERAL POSSIBLE PROBLEMS RE
REFTEL REQUESTS OF SAUDIS FOR AMENDMENTS TO LOA'S.

2. FIRST, WE DO NOT SEE WHY LOA SHOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE
THAT DELIVERIES WILL BE MADE TO LOCAL SAUDI MILITARY
MISSION. LET'S LET SAUDIS WORK THIS OUT WITH YEMENIS.

3. WE SUGGEST FOLLOWING. AS IN CASE OTHER FMS
DELIVERIES, YARG CONTRACT WITH FREIGHT FORWARDER.
(BEHRENS, WHO DOES SAUDI DELIVERIES, COMES TO
MIND.) TITLE WILL THEN PASS TO YARG AT U.S. PORT
OF EMBARKATION RATHER THAN (AS IN CASE MAP DELIVERIES, USING
DOD CONTRACTED SHIPS) AT YEMENI PORT OF DEBARKATION.
(SAUDIS POINT THIS OUT IN THEIR REQUEST.) UNDER THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES, LOA DOES NOT HAVE TO SPECIFY HOW
GOODS OR TO WHOM GOODS WILL BE DELIVERED LOCALLY.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SANA 01284 190835Z

SAUDIS WILL, OF COURSE, HAVE TO PAY FREIGHT AND

COULD THUS SIMPLY INCLUDE YEMENI MATERIAL IN THEIR OWN SHIPMENTS, AND DELIVER IT LOCALLY TO WHOMEVER THEY PLEASED, SUBJECT OF COURSE TO YARG APPROVAL.

4. POINT IS THAT WE SHOULD NOT PUT INTO WRITING, IF WE DON'T HAVE TO, MEANS OF DELIVERY WHICH YEMENIS PROBABLY DON'T KNOW ABOUT YET AND WHICH IS, IN ADDITION, COMPLETELY UNTESTED.

5. LATTER POINT IS IMPORTANT. SAUDI MILITARY MISSION HERE MAY FIND TASK OF RECEIVING THESE GOODS MORE DEMANDING THAN IT THINKS. AS PRACTICAL MATTER MISSION WILL HAVE TO SUPERVISE UNLOADING, INVENTORY, DAMAGE CLAIMS, ASSEMBLY AS NECESSARY, MOVEMENT TO STORAGE, ACCOUNTING, ETC.

6. AGREEING IN LOA'S TO PARTICULAR METHOD OF DELIVERY MAY SEEM INNOCENT AND EASY NOW, BUT COULD ENMESH US IN INNECESSARY AND UNDESIRABLE PRACTICAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS.

7. TO MOVE TO ANOTHER POINT, AS REFLECTED IN FOURTH SAUDI REQUEST IN REFTEL, WE UNDERSTAND DEPTH OF SAUDI CONCERN THAT THEY, RATHER THAN USG, SHOULD GET CREDIT FOR THESE DELIVERIES AND SHOULD HAVE SOME CONTROL OVER THEM. WE BELIEVE THAT USG SHOULD BE READY TO COOPERATE FULLY IN THIS RESPECT, AND ACCOMMODATE SAUDI DESIRES. IT HAS BEEN, AFTER ALL, OUR CONSISTENT DESIRE TO GET SAUDIS OUT IN FRONT HERE. WE SHOULD LOSE NO OPPORTUNITY TO REASSURE SAUDIS OF THIS, ORALLY OR IN PRIVATE LETTERS.

8. BUT WE DO NOT THINK THAT LOA'S SHOULD BE AMENDED ALONG LINES OF FOURTH SAUDI REQUEST IN REFTEL. WE READ THAT TO MEAN THAT AS CONTRACT CONDITION WE WOULD HAVE TO CHANNEL ALL OUR CONTACTS WITH YARG THROUGH SAUDIS. THIS EMBASSY DOES NOT BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE IN THAT DEMEANING POSITION, EITHER LOCALLY OR AS GOVT. WHAT WE SHOULD BE SAYING TO SAUDIS INSTEAD, IN PRIVATE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SANA 01284 190835Z

LETTERS OR NOTES, IS THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSULT FULLY AND CLOSELY AND COOPERATE COMPLETELY. SAUDIS SHOULD UNDERSTAND AT SAME TIME, THAT WE HAVE CERTAIN INTERESTS OF OUR OWN IN MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP, NEED TO PURSUE THEM IN BILATERAL CHANNELS, AND WILL DO SO FROM TIME TO TIME.

9. LIKE SAUDIS, USG IS SEEKING TO BUILD SPECIAL

RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE HERE AS RESULT
OF SECURITY UNDERSTANDINGS. WE CAN (AND WILL) COOPERATE
WITH SAUDIS BUT WE SHOULD NOT LET OURSELVES BE TURNED
INTO SEARS ROEBUCK FOR ARMS.
SCOTES

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